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"There is little use in going to law with the devil while the court is

held in hell." 1

* This article has been reproduced with the permission of Kluwer Law
International, and will appear in the forthcoming publication of the Chartered
Institute of Arbitrators conference proceedings. For further copyright and sales
information, please contact Kluwer Law International, P.O. Box 85889, 2508 CN The
Hague, The Netherlands. Tel. +31 (0)70 308 1567.
** Professor of Law, Boston University. Counsel, Ropes & Gray. Vice President,
London Court of International Arbitration. Adapted from a paper presented to the
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators at its Boston Colloquium, September 26, 1996.
1 Diary of Humphrey O'Sullivan, entry for 6 January 1831, as reprinted in the
article by Melosina Lenox-Conyngham, Some Kilkenny Diaries, 47 OLD KiLKENNY
REv. (1995). The object of Mr. O'Sullivan's reflection was the remission of the
government imposed tithes, resisted not only in Ireland but also in sixteen counties in
England. Thanks are due to my friend Mike Harrington for bringing this jewel to my
attention.
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INTRODUCTION

More than one thoughtful business manager has contemplated the
prospect of litigation abroad in terms analogous to those used by the 19th
century diarist quoted above. When an international venture goes awry,
the dramatically disagreeable consequences can often include the
"hometown justice" of the other side's national courts: unfamiliar procedures, perhaps a foreign language, and in some countries, a xenophobic
or even corrupt judge.
The reality of bias against foreigners may often be less significant than
the perception that such prejudice exists. A recent study has found evidence that in federal civil actions in the United States, foreigners actually
fare better than domestic parties.2 One explanation for this counter-intuitive finding lies in a fear of litigation bias that causes foreign litigants to
continue to final judgment only if they have particularly strong cases.
To reduce the prospect of bias and uncertainty in litigation, many international contracts include a forum selection mechanism, which typically
falls into one of two categories: (i) a jurisdiction clause that grants exclusive adjudicatory competence to designated courts; or (ii) an arbitration
clause that provides for disputes arising out of the contract to be settled
under the rules of a relatively neutral arbitral institution. The relative
costs and benefits of each of these alternatives do not yield to facile analysis. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify several contexts in which arbitration will outperform court litigation in promoting reliable contract
enforcement.
I.

CONTEMPLATING ALTERNATIVES IN

CRoss

BORDER LITIGATION'

The text of an international sale, lease or loan agreement will often be
less important than the context of its enforcement. Who interprets an
international agreement will frequently be more significant than what the
applicable law says about the agreement's construction. Contracts do not
enforce themselves automatically, but need the intervention of flesh and

blood adjudicators. And in the international arena there exists no neutral
commercial court of compulsory jurisdiction.
In a domestic context, of course, failure to consider forum selection
may not make much of a difference. If a Boston seller must sue a Georgia
buyer in Atlanta (or vice versa), the dispute will take place within a rela-

tively homogeneous linguistic and procedural context. Proceedings can
usually be expected to unfold in some variant of the English language

according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2

See Kevin Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109

HARV. L. Rnv. 1120, 1122 (1996).

3 For a general survey of legal issues arising from cross-border commercial
litigation, see Detlev F. Vagts, Dispute-Resolution Mechanisms in International
Business, 203 RECUEIL DES CouRs (1987).
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If the buyer is located not in Atlanta, however, but in Athens, Algiers
or Aix-en-Provence, the court action may proceed not in the language of
Shakespeare, but in the tongue of Demosthenes, Mohammed or Moli~re.
Even if the linguistic hurdle can be overcome, local counsel must usually
be engaged to advise on what to one side will be an unfamiliar code of
civil procedure. In some countries the questionable integrity of the judicial system may make judicial proceedings resemble auctions more than
trials, with judgment going to the highest bidder.
Under the rules of an international arbitral institution such as the
International Chamber of Commerce or the London Court of International Arbitration, parties to an international contract can level the playing field by providing for an arbitral tribunal in a mutually accessible
country, chaired by someone of a nationality different from the parties,
with proceedings in a common language, and according to procedural
rules that give neither side an unfair advantage. The New York Arbitration Convention provides for the agreement and the resulting award to be
enforced in over one hundred countries."
As an alternative to arbitration an international contract might include
a jurisdiction clause (sometimes called a prorogation agreement), by
which the parties submit to the jurisdiction of tribunals within a particular
city, state, province or canton. For example, a contract between an
American distributor and a German manufacturer might provide for any
future disputes to be resolved by the High Court of London. Multinationals with superior bargaining power might even be able to impose a
jurisdiction clause that designates their home courts.
I.

COURT SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES

From an American perspective, shopping for a court remains problematic, even if both parties originally were in agreement about the choice.
Jurisdiction clauses can on occasion backfire to raise the risk of a judicial
hijacking in which the dispute ends up before the adversary's home court.
Three factors account for this perhaps surprising state of affairs: the failure of the United States to conclude any jurisdiction and judgments
treaty, the absence of a federal court selection statute, and the possibility
that a designated court may refuse to hear a case due to lack of subject
matter jurisdiction or on forum non conveniens grounds.
4 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 30 [hereinafter New York Convention].

5 The verb "prorogate" sometimes causes confusion because it covers not only
submission to a judge's jurisdiction by consent of the parties, but also a legislature's
decision to adjourn (or prorogue) its session until a later date. Common to both types
of prorogation is the notion of extension. By contract the parties extend the judge's
jurisdiction, and by adjournment the parliament extends its debates until a later time.
The usage of prorogate in the context of court selection apparently comes to us from
Scots law, and derives from the French proroger,meaning to prolong or to protract.
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A. No Treaties
First, the United States is not a party to a single treaty providing for
enforcement of foreign judgments. Even Great Britain has refused to rat-

ify a judgments treaty with the United States from fear of civil juries,
punitive damages, strict liability, and other quaint aspects of the American legal system. While courts in some jurisdictions will generally enforce
foreign judgments on the basis of internal law (giving the judgment res

judicata effect as a matter of comity rather than international obligation),
not all countries are so generous.
B.

No Statutes

Second, no American jurisdiction

-

with the exception of New York

state in limited cases - will treat court selection clauses as dispositive.
No federal statute enforces choice-of-court clauses in the way that the
Federal Arbitration Act enforces arbitration agreements.
In practice, of course, courts do tend to recognize jurisdiction clauses

at least if they will permit judges to reduce their workloads by sending

-

cases elsewhere. However, respect for the clause remains a matter of

judicial discretion. Court selection agreements will constitute only one
factor to be weighed among many others in the balance of convenience
and fairness.

Several Supreme Court admiralty decisions are often cited for the
proposition that court selection clauses will be enforced. 7 Yet what these

cases actually say is that jurisdiction agreements will be respected if "reasonable" by reference to a multiplicity of factors that vary from court to
court. One decision set forth nine factors relevant to the reasonableness

of a jurisdiction clause, emphasizing the "totality of the circumstances
measured in the interests of justice."'

In addition to private interests

New York State courts must honor a court selection clause in a transaction
involving not less than $1 million and subject to New York law. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.
LAw § 5-1402(1) (McKinney 1989); N.Y. C.P.L.R. Rule 327(b) (McKinney 1990).
7 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); see also Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S.
22 (1988).
8 See D'Antuono v. CCH Computax Sys. Inc., 570 F. Supp. 708, 712 (D.R.I. 1983).
The factors included (1) the contract's substantive governing law; (2) the place of
execution of the contract; (3) the place of performance of the relevant transactions;
(4) the type of remedies available in the designated forum; (5) the public policy of the
initial forum; (6) the location of the parties, witnesses and evidence; (7) the relative
bargaining power of the parties; (8) fraud, undue influence or "other extenuating or
(exacerbating) circumstances;" and (9) the conduct of the parties. Id.at 712.
6
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(e.g., location of the parties and witnesses), courts have also stressed what

they refer to as the public interests of "systemic integrity and fairness."9
The situation is even more complex when one looks at state law.' Several states still refuse to enforce court selection clauses, either in general,
or with respect to particular types of contracts such as franchise

agreements."
Even if state law does accept in theory the validity of jurisdiction
clauses, courts in practice may give the clauses a restrictive interpretation
that vitiates their effect. For example, some court selection clauses have
been construed as non-exclusive, therefore inviting competing actions in
different fora. Other clauses have been read to exclude actions based on
extra-contractual wrongs such as deceit and unfair business practices. In
one relatively recent case, the trial judge was required to determine the
"principal focus" of the plaintiff's claims (in order to avoid parallel
actions for contractual and non-contractual actions), with the consequence that to the date of this2 writing the case has not been sent to the

contractually selected forum.'

9 Detroit Coke Corp. v. NKK Chem. USA, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 214,219 (E.D. Mich.
1992) (citing Moses v. Business Cards Express, Inc., 929 F.2d 1131, 1136-37 (6th Cir.
1991)).
10 State law may apply not only in state courts, but also in federal courts where
jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship between the parties. Some federal
courts see enforcement of a jurisdiction clause as a matter of substantive law,
requiring application of state norms in diversity cases under the principle of Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Alexander Proudfoot Co. World Headquarters
L.P. v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912, 916-19 (11th Cir. 1989); Diaz Contracting, Inc. v. Nanco
Contracting Corp., 817 F.2d 1047, 1050 (3d Cir. 1987); Farmland Indus. v. FrazierParrott Commodities, Inc., 806 F.2d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 1986); Bryant Elec. Co. v. City
of Fredricksburg, 762 F.2d 1192, 1193 (4th Cir. 1985). Other courts have assumed
(often with little discussion) that the matter is procedural and that federal venue law
applies. See Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 374 (7th Cir. 1990);
Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 512 (9th Cir. 1988); LFC
Lessors, Inc. v. Pacific Sewers Maintenance, Corp., 739 F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir. 1984);

Rhodes v. Kalenuik, No. 92-10879-WF, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8644, at *1 (D. Mass.
May 24, 1994); Ritchie v. Carvel Corp., 714 F. Supp. 700, 702 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
TUC Elec., Inc. v. Eagle Telephonics, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 35, 37-38 (D. Conn. 1988);
D'Antuono v. CCH Computax Sys., 570 F. Supp. 708, 711 (D.R.I. 1983); C. Pappas
Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 565 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (D. Mass. 1983).
11 See cases surveyed in WILLIAM W. PARK, INTMRNATIoNAL FORUM SELECrION
34-36 (1995). For a recent illustration of restrictive state law, see Kubis & Perszyk
Assocs., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., A-104-95, 1996 N.J. LEXIS 955, at *36 (NJ.
1996) (arising under New Jersey Franchise Practices Act, the ill-fated jurisdiction
clause would have sent parties to Santa Clara, California).
12 See Jacobson v. Mailboxes Etc. U.S.A., Inc., 419 Mass. 572, 574-75 (1995),
commenting on Nute v. Hamilton Mutual InsuranceCo., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174 (1856),
in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court announced in dictum that it
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C. Default by the Chosen Court
Finally, subject matter jurisdictional limits and judicial discretion to
decline to hear a case may render ineffective an otherwise valid jurisdiction clause. Unless a case implicates a question of federal law, federal
court power generally is limited to cases arising on the basis of diversity
of citizenship. The statutory requirement of complete diversity of citizenship has been extended to international cases. Unless a case raises a
question of federal law, one foreigner normally may not sue another in
federal court, even if an American party is involved. This means that
when a foreign company is on both sides of the litigation - as may often
happen if an American multinational's foreign subsidiary is involved in
the dispute - a federal court designated by a jurisdiction clause may be
required to dismiss the case, regardless of how eager the litigants are to
thrust jurisdiction on the designated court.
A court with jurisdiction may also decline to hear a case on forum non
conveniens grounds because of the location of witnesses and documents,
or the drain on public resources. Unlike the practice in 18th century England, judges no longer get paid a special supplement for each case
decided. Only New York has done away with forum non conveniens in
court-selection cases, and only within the narrow confines of a statute
covering certain actions arising out of transactions of a million dollars or
more.' 3 While one overworked judge may enforce a jurisdiction clause
that sends the case elsewhere, thereby clearing a crowded docket, there is
no guarantee that an equally overworked judge in the contractuallyselected jurisdiction will not decline to hear the dispute on the basis that a
more convenient forum may be found elsewhere. 4 This risk of judicial
default is particularly significant in a transaction between two foreign
entities, in which some courts are restrained by statutory jurisdictional
limits' 5 and others will as a matter of discretion decline to hear 16disputes
when the controversy lacks sufficient connection with the state.
would abandon a century and a half of precedent holding court selection clauses

presumptively invalid.
13 See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-1402(1)(a) (McKinney 1989); see also N.Y.
C.P.L.R. Rule 327(b) (McKinney 1990).
14 At least one Circuit, however, has held that signature of a valid court selection
clause constitutes a "waiver of the right to move for a change of venue on the ground
of inconvenience to the moving party." Northwestern Nat'l. Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916
F.2d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 1990).
'r See N.Y. Bus. CoRe. LAw § 1314(b)(1)-(5) (McKinney 1986); see also N.Y.
BANMNG LAW § 200 (b) (Consol. 1982). The effect of these limits was to some extent
mitigated by enactment of General Obligations Law § 5-1402.
16 See Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, Ltd., 281 Mass. 303, 313-15
(1933).
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IIm.

HALLMARKS OF ARBITRATION

Samuel Johnson once said that "a cow is a very good animal in the
field, but we turn it out of the garden. ' '17 Arbitration is very much like
Dr. Johnson's proverbial cow: useful in some contexts, but in other situations quite out of place - no more welcome than a half-ton farm animal
tramping through a flower bed.
A. The Good News
In contrast to courts, arbitrators rarely refuse to hear a dispute on
grounds of forum non conveniens. If the parties can provide an adequate
deposit to cover costs, learned professors around the world can usually be
found to serve as arbitrators, eager to augment their meager academic
stipends with the appropriate fees.?8
Just as significantly, the New York Arbitration Convention, backed by
a network of national arbitration statutes, binds most of the world to
enforce an arbitration clause and the resulting award. The Convention
directs courts to refer the parties to arbitration if their contractual relationship is covered by a valid agreement to arbitrate, and gives to a foreign arbitral award the same force as that given to a domestic one.
Although peculiarities of local contract law play a role in determining the
validity of an arbitration clause, American case law has made it clear that
states may not place special limits on the validity of an agreement to arbitrate that would not apply to contracts in general.19
Arbitration clauses can also enhance adjudicatory predictability when
multinational enterprises enter into contracts with foreign states. Under
the Act of State doctrine, judges in the United States have sometimes felt
prohibited from calling into question foreign governmental acts, such as
exchange controls or expropriation without adequate compensation. The
Federal Arbitration Act, however, provides that enforcement of arbitral
awards shall not be refused on the basis of the Act of State doctrine.2'
Likewise a plea of sovereign immunity poses less of an obstacle to
enforcing an arbitral award than a court judgment. In the United States,
court judgments against foreign sovereigns can be enforced only if there
is a link between assets to be attached and the activity that gave rise to
the underlying claim. For example, if a lender wishes to enforce a court
judgment against a defaulting debtor by attaching the debtor's bank
account, there must be some connection between the underlying loan and
the funds to be attached. However, no such nexus requirement exists for
17 JAMES BOSWELL, THE LI OF SAMUEL JOHNSON (reprint 1925) (1901).
18 On deposits for costs, see W. LAURENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W. PARK & JAN
PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION

1990).
19 See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996).
20 9 U.S.C. § 15 (1994)

243-49 (2d ed.
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arbitration awards, which can be enforced against any property used in a
commercial activity in the United States, even if the activity is other than
the one giving rise to the claim.2
For financial institutions "lender liability" litigation provides an additional reason to look to arbitration clauses. In lender liability claims, borrowers may assert a banker's breach of good-faith in order to obtain
damages for refusal to advance funds or extend repayment.' To discourage excessive and unpredictable damage awards by juries in lender liability litigation, several American financial institutions now provide for
arbitration in credit agreements. An arbitral panel presumably will be
less swayed by solicitude for the borrower than members of a civil jury
whose own credit problems may make them empathize with the debtor.
B.

The Less Than Good News

Arbitration has its downside, however. Many lawyers distrust arbitration because it lacks full appeal on the merits and formal rules of evidence. Occasionally, an undisciplined "wild card" arbitrator will
compromise on the merits of a dispute by slicing the baby in two, much as
King Solomon threatened to do in the Bible story.' As discussed below,
less anecdotal drawbacks to arbitration exist with respect to consolidation
of related actions, monitoring arbitrator jurisdiction and, in the United
States, the interaction of state and federal arbitration law.
1. Consolidation
Although the rules of some arbitral institutions provide for voluntary
consolidation of related arbitrations (for example, Article 13.1 of the
Arbitration Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration), this
does not obviate the need to obtain the consent of the party to be
joined.' For better or for worse, the Federal Arbitration Act does not
authorize forced consolidation of different arbitration proceedings, even
21 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(6) (1994). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) (1994)
(concerning waiver of immunity from jurisdiction).
2 An expression of catch-word quality, the term "lender liability" implicates a

bank's implicit obligation of good faith in its dealings with customers. This populist
concept in essence makes the financier a partner in the borrower's business venture.
See Reid v. Key Bank, 821 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987). See generally Wiflliam W. Park,
L'arbitrageet le recouvrement des prts consentis l des ddbiteurs6trangers,37 MCGILL

LJ. 375 (1992).
23 One should recall, however, that the King's problematic decision was only an
interim award, and that the story did have a happy ending. See 1 Kings 3:16-27.
2 See generally Michael Mustill, Multipartite Arbitrations: An Agenda for LawMakers, in 7 ARB. INT'L, 393, 389 (1991).
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if they present similar questions of law and fact.' Therefore, a company
may be whipsawed by inconsistent results in connected contract disputes,
unless arbitration takes place in a state that does provide for joinder of
related claims.2
2. Arbitral Jurisdiction
a. The Consensual Foundation
An arbitrator's power derives from the consent of the parties to a dispute.27 Absent this consent, commercial arbitrators will normally have
no connection to the controverted events sufficient to justify deference to
their authority.'
Judges get involved in determining the contours of arbitrator jurisdiction for the simple reason that the arbitral process exists in the shadow of
public coercion. Directly and indirectly the state lends its power to
enforce the agreement to arbitrate. Court proceedings are stayed; arbitral awards are given res judicata effect; and the loser's assets may be
seized. The integrity of the judicial system that enforces the arbitral process will, of necessity, require courts to examine arbitrator jurisdiction
independently of the arbitrators' own ruling on their jurisdiction. There
25

See United Kingdom of Great Britain v.Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1993)

(denying consolidation of arbitrations with Boeing and Textron, Inc. relating to
contract with the British Ministry of Defense to develop an electronic fuel system).
2 See, e.g., MAss. Gm. LAws ch. 251, § 2A (1994) (calling for consolidation as
provided in the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure and permitting Rule 42
joinder of actions "involving a common question of law or fact"). Compare CAL. CIv.
CODE § 1281.3 (West 1992); Arbitration Ordinance, ch. 341, § 6B (Oct. 1990),
Poc.
reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBrATION Hong
Kong Annex I-1, 1-6 (Albert Jan Van den Berg & Pieter Sanders eds., 1984) (Supp.
No. Aug. 15, 1993) (applicable to domestic arbitration); Arbitration Act of Dec. 1,
1986, Code of Civil Procedure, § 1046, reprintedin 3 INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMvERCIAL ARBITRATION The Netherlands: Annex 1-1, 1-7 (Albert Jan Van den
Berg & Pieter Sanders eds., 1984) (Supp. No. 7 April 7, 1987).
27 The state may, of course, supplement the parties' express mission to the
arbitrator with standards of fairness and procedural regularity that are imposed as a
condition for recognition of the arbitral award. But the origin of the arbitrator's
power lies in an act evidencing the parties' intent to waive the otherwise applicable
rules of judicial jurisdiction in favor of private adjudication.
28 So-called court-annexed arbitration within the United States rests on a different
footing, of course. In reality this process constitutes conciliation more than
arbitration, since the parties normally retain a right to a de novo trial. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 655 (1994). Also misleading is the label given to "arbitration" of minor claims
mandated by some state statutes, whereby the state delegates (or maybe franchises?)
its adjudicatory function to an organization such as the American Arbitration
Association. See Minnesota's statute requiring arbitration of motor vehicle accident
claims not in excess of ten thousand dollars ($10,000). MiNN.STAT. ANN.§ 65B.525
(West 1996).
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may be nothing wrong with a judicial opinion that includes a bit of decorative hypocrisy designed to show sensitivity to an arbitrator's pride.
"Needless to say, great weight should be given to the learned arbitrator's
views on the matter" writes a judge about to vacate for excess of jurisdiction one of those awards that needs to be seen to be believed. But for
judicial monitordng of jurisdictional issues to be meaningful, judges must
make up their own minds. By agreeing to arbitration, the parties have
assumed the risk that the arbitrator may get it wrong on the merits of the
dispute. This does not, however, mean that arbitrators (or would-be arbitrators) should have power to decide matters never submitted to them.
Therefore, a judge's examination of jurisdiction must be comprehensive. The type of limited inquiry that verifies only the "primafacie existence" of the arbitration clause may be fine for an arbitral institution
deciding only whether to allow a claim to be filed. However, when a
judge is asked to enforce an arbitration agreement or award, shallow
examination of an arbitrator's jurisdiction can make little sense either in
logic or in sound arbitration policy.29 An arbitrator cannot have just a
little bit of jurisdiction, any more than a woman can be just a little bit
pregnant.
b. First Options v. Kaplan
Among the American cases on arbitral jurisdiction, few are of more
consequence than the recent United States Supreme Court decision that
considered joinder to an arbitration of a person who never signed the
arbitration clause.3 0 In First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,3 1 an
arbitral award was rendered against both a company and its owners with
respect to debts owed to a securities clearing house. The owners, however, had never signed the arbitration agreement, and consequently
argued that they were not bound by the award. The Supreme Court held
that the scope of the arbitration agreement was an issue for courts to
decide de novo, without deference to the arbitral finding on the matter,
and affirmed the appellate court finding that the owners had not agreed
to arbitrate.3 2
The problematic part of the Supreme Court's opinion lies in dictum
suggesting that in some situations what the Court called "the arbitrability
29 Consider the problematic approach taken in Apollo Computer,Inc. v. Berg, 886
F.2d 469 (1st Cir. 1989) and its sequel Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Berg, 61 F.3d 101 (1st
Cir. 1995).
30 The case has special significance in a cross-border context, where an award
against both a parent and a subsidiary (perhaps rendered on a theory of de facto
agency) might be presented for enforcement under the New York Convention against
the parent's assets around the world.
31 115 S.Ct. 1920 (1995).
32

The Court of Appeals had reversed a district court decision deferring to the

arbitral tribunal's jurisdictional ruling.
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question itself" may be submitted to arbitration. In such cases the courts
must defer ("give considerable leeway") to arbitrators' decisions on the
limits of their own jurisdiction.
What exactly this means is not clear. The dictum might indicate no
more than that the parties to one agreement (or alleged agreement) can
always enter into a subsequent contract that submits to arbitration a
question bearing on arbitral jurisdiction under the first agreement. For
example, shippers might agree that an arbitrator rather than a judge will
determine whether an arbitration clause in a charter party had been
incorporated by reference into a bill of lading. Or a parent corporation
might agree to arbitrate the issue of whether an arbitration clause signed
by a subsidiary binds the parent.
Human nature being what it is, however, one can anticipate misapplication of the dictum. For example, suppose that the arbitration clause in
First Options had ended with language to the effect that "arbitrators shall
determine all questions relating to their jurisdiction." Some lawyers will
see this as a license for the arbitral tribunal to pronounce in a binding
way on whether or not the owners were to be covered by the arbitral
award. After all, so the argument would run, the clause does say that the
arbitrators can decide their own jurisdiction.
On reflection, however, such a result would be tantamount to saying
that a verbal formula can create rights and duties independent of its context. Such voodoo jurisprudence would confuse a contract recital that
arbitrators have jurisdictional power with a genuine grant of such power
by the party sought to be bound. If the owners had not accepted the
arbitration clause, how could they have agreed thereby to give the arbitrator power to determine arbitral jurisdiction? Whatever jurisdictional
defects had tainted the agreement to arbitrate would also infect the jurisdictional submission.
Compdtence-Compitence
Misapplication of the arbitrability dictum in First Options is all the
more likely because it mimics certain European doctrines about allocating tasks between arbitrators and judges. Loosely referred to as competence-comp~tence (literally "jurisdiction to decide jurisdiction"), this
amalgam of disparate notions carries the seeds of confusion in its chameleon-like nature, serving as a shibboleth to justify deference to arbitral
determinations of hard jurisdictional questions that in any sensible legal
system ought to be answered, in the last analysis, by courts.
In its simplest formulation, compitence-comp~tence means no more
than that arbitrators can look into questions that affect their jurisdiction
without waiting for a court to do so. Proceedings need not be stopped to
refer a jurisdictional issue to judges. However, the arbitrators' decisions
about their power would be subject to a court's review at any time, either
in connection with a motion to compel arbitration or in the context of
parallel judicial proceedings on the merits of the dispute.
c.
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In France, however, compdtence-compdtence means more. The statute
that gives the arbitrators jurisdiction to decide their jurisdiction operates
in tandem with an explicit disposition requiring courts to stay litigation
until arbitration is finished."3 Article 1458 of the Nouveau code de proc6dure civile provides that when a dispute has been referred to an arbitral
tribunal, French courts must decline to hear the case until after an award
has been rendered.' Deference to an ongoing arbitration is required
even if an independent judicial examination would reveal that the arbitrators lacked power to hear the case. When an arbitral tribunal has not yet
been constituted, court litigation can go forward only if the alleged arbitration agreement is clearly void (manifestement nulle).
The Swiss formulation of compdtence-competence provides that an arbitral tribunal shall normally ("en gdndral"I"in der Regel") rule on its own
jurisdiction through an interlocutory decision.35 In Switzerland, however,
nothing equivalent to the extreme French rule requires courts to refrain
from hearing challenges to the validity of the arbitration clause until the
end of the arbitration. On the contrary, Swiss courts will verify the existence of an arbitration clause, at least in a summary fashion, when3 6asked
to hear a dispute allegedly covered by an agreement to arbitrate.
For German scholars, Kompetenz-Kompetenz has taken on yet another

meaning. The expression has been used by the Bundesgerichtshof to
describe a situation in which an arbitral tribunal is given power to rule on
its own jurisdiction, free from any independent judicial review at all. s '
However, the expected reform of German arbitration law (adopting the
UNCITRAL Model Law rule on interim jurisdictional awards) will
change this situation.38

'

See generally
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650-60 (1996).

4 NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCtDURE CIVIL [N.C.P.C.] art. 1458 (Fr.).
35 Loi SuR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVA [LDIP] art. 186(3).

LDIP arts. 7, 176. See Compagnie de Navigation et Transports S.A. v.
Mediterranean Shipping Co., S.A., ATF 121 1I 38 (16 Jan. 1995).
36

Zivil Senate. Urt. V. 5 Mai 1977 i. S. Fa. A. GmbH (A.G.) w. Fa. F. SA (ASt.)
BGHZ 68, 356. See discussion in PETER SCHLOSSER, DAS RECHT DER
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATEN SCHIEDSGERICErSBARKEIT § 556 (1989).
m See commentary in Bundesministerium der Justiz, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur
Neuregelung des Schiedsverfahrensrechts 132 (Juli 1995), which states that after
adoption of draft law Section 1040 (the equivalent of UNCITRAL Model Law Article
16) courts would always have the last word on arbitral jurisdiction. However, it is not
evident why the new rule would necessarily preclude a Kompetenz-KompetenzKlausel entered into by the parties subsequent to the principal arbitration agreement.
The second agreement might give arbitrators power to decide an issue that bears on
arbitral jurisdiction, such as whether an arbitration clause had been incorporated into
one agreement by reference to another.
37
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d. Preconditionsto Arbitration

The dictum in First Options has already begun to enliven, and to confuse, debate about the much vexed matter of time limits for bringing an
arbitration. No consensus yet exists on whether courts or arbitrators
should have the last word on time bars, which under certain arbitration
rules provide for disputes to be brought within a certain number of years
after the controverted events.3 9
In actions against securities brokers, cases are split on whether courts
or arbitrators should decide whether a claim is barred by time limits contained in arbitration rules. ° One recent decision, holding a time bar to
be a question for arbitrators, constructed its analysis on a combination of
the dictum in FirstOptions and provisions in the relevant arbitration rules
stating that arbitrators could interpret provisions of the rules themselves.4 The risk in these cases, of course, is that some arbitrators and
judges will presume their own conclusion, mistaking the dictum in First
Options for the holding in the case.
Some decisions have dealt with analogous issues implicating statutes of
limitations, holding that timeliness is a matter for judges in the context of
a motion to compel arbitration, but for arbitrators when raised in an arbitration of the underlying claim.' The theoretical framework of such
decisions rests on the assumption that there are two separate contracts,
subject to two separate statutes of limitations: the principal agreement
(to buy, sell, license, lease or lend) and the agreement to arbitrate any
dispute arising out of the principal agreement.
3. Federal-State Conflicts
One consequence of the American civil war is that the Federal Arbitration Act applies even in Alabama, at least to disputes that in some way
39 See Rule 10304 (formerly Section 15) of the National Association of Securities
Dealers Code of Arbitration, providing that "[n]o dispute, claim, or controversy shall
be eligible for submission to arbitration under this Code where six (6) years have
elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to the act or dispute, claim or
controversy." Recently proposed changes to the NASD Code of Arbitration would
suspend this rule for three years.
40 The Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have considered time
limits contained in arbitration rules to constitute a jurisdictional prerequisite to
arbitration, to be determined by courts, while the First, Second, Fifth, Eighth and
Ninth Circuits have held the matter to be for the arbitrator. See cases summarized in

Paine Webber, Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589, 596-99 (1st Cir. 1996).
See, e.g., id. at 599-602 (citing language in Section 35 of the NASD Code of
Arbitration Procedure providing for arbitrators to "interpret and determine the
applicability of all provisions under this Code").
41

4 See National Iranian Oil Co. v. Mapco Int'l, Inc., 983 F.2d 485, 594 (3d Cir.
1992); Avant Petroleum, Inc. v. Pecten Arabian Ltd., 696 F. Supp. 42, 45 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
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implicate interstate commerce. Unfortunately, not all aspects of the
interaction of federal and state arbitration law in the United States are so
clear-cut.
Generally the Federal Arbitration Act will apply not only in federal
courts, but also in state court actions involving "interstate commerce, '' 43 a
concept interpreted broadly to cover the full extent of Congressional
power under the Commerce Clause. 4" Therefore, the Federal Arbitration
Act should normally preempt application of state arbitration law that is
more restrictive than federal law.
This seemingly simple principle has not always been easy to apply in
practice. For it is often less than self-evident exactly which state law rules
will be considered more restrictive than federal law, particularly when the
state rules have no analogue in the Federal Arbitration Act.
Some recent United States Supreme Court cases have obscured rather
than clarified the proper relationship of federal and state arbitration law.
The Court held in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior University that an arbitration in California could

be stayed under provisions of state law.45 The Court reasoned that by
their contractual choice-of-law clause, the parties had incorporated California arbitration law into their agreement to arbitrate. However, the
same Court last year, in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc.,

upheld an arbitral award for punitive damages, notwithstanding that the
relevant choice-of-law clause called for application of New York law,
which prohibits arbitrators from awarding punitive damages. Squaring
these two decisions is difficult to say the least.
One important principle that has emerged is that state law cannot
make implementation of arbitration agreements more difficult than other
contractual commitments. In Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, the

United States Supreme Court struck down a Montana "notice requirement" that said arbitration clauses had to be in capital letters on the first
page of the contract." The Court found such threshold limitations on
arbitration agreements
to undermine "the goals and policies" of the Fed47
eral Arbitration Act.
43 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-5 (1984).
44 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 842-43 (1995), in which
the Supreme Court rejected the narrower construction of "interstate commerce,"
which would have applied the Federal Arbitration Act only to transactions in which
the parties actually contemplated activities in more than one state.
45 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
46 116 S.Ct. 1652, 1656 (1996) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts a
Montana statute requiring the arbitration clause to be "typed in underlined capitals
on the first page of the contract;" dispute arising out of franchise to operate "sub"
sandwich shop in Montana). A similar approach was taken by the First Circuit in
Securities Industry Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1124 (1st Cir. 1989); see also
Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S.Ct. 834 (1995).
47 Doctor's Assoc., 116 S.Ct. at 1657.
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With respect to many state laws, however, it is unclear what rules will
be deemed consistent with the "goals and policies" of the Federal Arbitration Act. For example, in the United States no firm consensus exists
yet on whether measures of interim relief and pre-award attachment in

non-maritime arbitration are consistent with the New York Arbitration
Convention. Some courts reason that by bargaining for arbitration the

parties have implicitly excluded intervention by national courts until an
award is rendered, while others view pre-award attachment as a way to
maximize the efficiency of the arbitral process consistent with the parties'
presumed intent.' Consolidation of arbitrations arising out of related
claims constitutes another illustration of an issue as to which state arbitration law may arguably supplement rather than conflict with the Federal
Arbitration Act.49
More rather than less conflict between federal and state law can be

expected, as some states attempt to implement consumer protection
measures, and others enact their own international arbitration statutes in
the form of the UNCITRAL Model Law. The Federal Arbitration Act,
unlike the arbitration law of several European countries, contains neither

a distinction between domestic and international arbitration, nor provision for sheltering consumers from abusive arbitration agreements. New
state laws in these areas are bound to be a lawyer's dream in generating

litigation.
C.

50
Expert or Arbitrator?

Notwithstanding Shakespeare's suggestion that what we call something
may not matter,51 it often can make a significant difference whether a
decision-maker is characterized as an "arbitrator" rather than an

"expert." An expert, in the sense discussed here, is a decision-maker designated to settle an open question in a contractual relationship. Also
48 Compare McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT S.p.A., 501 F.2d 1032 (3d Cir.
1974) (pre-award attachment denied) with CarolinaPower & Light Co. v. Uranex,451
F. Supp. 1044 (N.D.Cal 1977) (pre-award attachment allowed). For a case in which
pre-award attachment permitted by state legislation did not withstand a challenge
based on inconsistency with the New York Arbitration Convention, see Cooper v.
Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A., 57 N.Y.2d 408 (1982). See generally David E.
Wagoner, Interim Relief in InternationalArbitration,Disp. RESOL. J., Oct. 1996, at 68.
49 See New Eng. Energy Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988)
(holding that federal court sitting in Massachusetts may order consolidation of related
arbitrations pursuant to state statute, MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 251, § 2A (1994)).
50 See generally CHARLES JARROssON, LA NonON D'ARBrrRAGE §§ 112-57
(1987). For an exploration of how to define arbitration under English law, see
MICHAEL J. MUSTILL & STEWART

C. BoYD,

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

38-50 (2d

ed. 1989).
r1 See WmLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, Act 2, Scene 2, line 85.
"What's in a name? that which we call a rose by any other name would smell as
sweet."
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called an evaluator or appraiser, the role of such decision-makers should
not be confused with that of a counselor or witness appointed only to
advise courts or arbitrators.
An arbitrator's award will benefit from the network of enforcement
provisions created by multinational treaties (principally the New York
Arbitration Convention) and national arbitration statutes. On the other
hand, enforcement of an expert's opinion will usually be subject to
whatever general contract law principles and defenses can be invoked to
enforce respect for agreements.5" Moreover, arbitrators will generally be
immune from suit for errors or omissions, while appraisers and experts
will not.53
It is easier to describe the consequences of characterizing a decisionmaker as an arbitrator than to describe how the characterization should
be made. The existence of a dispute is one factor sometimes said to distinguish the exercise of arbitral functions from expert appraisement or
valuation. The role of experts is said to be the avoidance of disputes,
while the function of arbitrators is to decide them. 4
For the purpose of deciding whether a particular decision is covered
under an arbitration statute or the New York Convention, courts tend to
reason analogically, looking to the criteria that make a process more or
less like a judicial hearing.55 The label given to the decision-making process by the parties may carry great weight, but will not in all cases be
determinative. 'In the United States, the factors that are usually cited to
distinguish the iroles of arbitrator and expert are (i) whether a dispute
exists, (ii) whether there is an ultimate determination of liability, and (iii)
whether the decision-maker conducts a hearing and takes evidence from

See generally Jean-Frangois Bourque, L'Expdrience du Centre International
d'Expertise de la CCI et le Ddveloppement de l'Expertise Internationale,1995 REVUE
DE L'ARBITRAGE 231.
52

53 See, e.g., Arenson v. Casson Beckman Rutley & Co., 1977 App. Cas. 405.
54 See the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Sport Maska Inc. v. Zittrer, [1988]
S.C.R. 564, relating to arbitrator immunity. "[T]he essential prerequisite for [the
decision maker] to claim immunity as an arbitrator is that, by the time the matter is
submitted to him for decision, there should be a formulated dispute between at least
two parties." Id. at 588 (quoting Lord Simon in Arenson v. CassonBeckman Rutley &
Co. [1975] 3 All E.R. 901, 912).
55 See, e.g., Frydman v. Cosmair Inc., 94 Civ. 3772 (LAP), 1995 WL 404841, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. July 6, 1.995) (holding the New York Convention does not apply to a
determination of the price of shares (at the break-up of a joint venture) under Article
1592 of the French Code civil (arbitraged'un tiers), with the consequence that the

litigation over enforcement of the decision could not be removed to federal court
under 9 U.S.C. §§ 203, 205 (1994)).

1997]

TEXT AND CONTEXT

the parties, as would a judge.56 Courts in Europe have looked to similar
features. 57
Another approach to determining whether an individual acts as an
arbitrator or an expert might be to reason in a teleological fashion, rather
than analogically: this is, to ask whether the goals of an arbitration statute or treaty will be served by treating a decision-maker as an arbitrator.
Generally, such laws are intended to provide a framework to promote
finality (while safeguarding procedural integrity) in cases where parties to
a controverted event have agreed to abandon recourse to courts in favor
of private dispute resolution. Such a teleological test would distinguish
arbitrators from experts by asking whether the questions posed to the
decision-maker had been articulated as a claim for relief before a court.
For example, a building contractor and a customer, fighting over the nonpayment of the contractor's bill, might ask a decision-maker "Does the
roof leak?" In the alternative, the question might be phrased as "Does
Customer owe $10,000 to Contractor?" The decision-maker presented
with the first question would normally be an expert, while one who
answers the latter question would usually be an arbitrator.
D. UnilateralClauses?

The best of all worlds - or the worst, depending on one's perspective
would be for one side to have an option to elect either arbitration or
court proceedings. Such a unilateral right to arbitrate would permit significant flexibility with respect to elements affecting litigation strategy
which are hard to forecast when a contract is signed. For example, the
party with the option could assess, after the dispute arose, whether it had
an interest in the type of discovery available in court.
Whether unilateral clauses will be enforceable is not entirely certain.
The principle of "mutuality" (of remedy and/or of obligation) has occasionally been invoked to render invalid an arbitration agreement. 58 In at
least one case, however, the principle of mutuality was pressed into service to justify enforcement of a forum selection clause for the benefit of a
defendant who was not a party to the agreement.5 9 In contrast to court
-

56 See City of Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S. 180, 194-99 (1910); Shepard &
Morse Lumber Co. v. Collins, 256 P.2d 500, 502 (Or. 1953); Sanitary Farm Dairies,
Inc. v. Gammel, 195 F.2d 106, 113 (8th Cir. 1952). See generally SAMUEL WILLISTON,
16A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNTRAcrs § 1919 (1976).
67 See cases cited in JARROssON, supra note 50, §§ 206-290 and MUSTILL &BOYD,

supra note 50, at 38-50. See also the Tribunal f~dral suisse in ATF 117 Ia 365.
58 See, e.g., Hull v. Norcom, Inc., 750 F.2d 1547, 1550 (11th Cir. 1985). For cases
contra, see Sablosky v. Gordon Co., 73 N.Y. 2d 133 (1989) and Becker Autoradio
U.S.A., Inc v. Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH, 585 F.2d 39, 46 (3d Cir. 1978). See
generally Laurent Niddarn, UnilateralArbitration Clauses in Commercial Arbitration,
1996 Ann. Disp. RES. LJ. 147 (1996).

69 See Frietsch v. Refco, Inc., 56 F.3d 825, 827-28 (7th Cir. 1995).
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selection clauses covered by the Bruxelles and Lugano Conventions, as to
which unilateral jurisdiction selection seems to be admitted,6 ° no treaty

provision deals with mutuality in international arbitration.
IV. Ti

ImERACriON OF CHOICE OF LAW AND CHOICE OF FORUM

Arbitration ,and jurisdiction clauses are sometimes linked to choice-oflaw clauses in such a way as to defeat fundamental policies of the place of

contract performance. Examples of such mandatory norms include usury
limits, laws related to consumer protection, currency controls, bankruptcies, competition law, securities regulation, environmental protection and
boycotts.
The United States Supreme Court addressed this matter in its decision
in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.6 1 The Court
warned that it would not enforce an arbitration agreement that operated
in tandem with a choice-of-law clause as a "prospective waiver" of the

right to pursue mandatory public norms, such as the anti-trust claims at
issue in that case.62
This "prospective waiver" dictum was tested in a spate of litigation arising from financial losses incurred by the Lloyd's of London insurance

exchange. Investors in Lloyd's insurance syndicates brought actions in
the United States alleging violations of American securities laws. The
dispute resolution clauses in the relevant agreements contained clauses
stipulating that the contracts would be construed in accordance with the
laws of England, and that disputes would be submitted to arbitration in
London, subject to the jurisdiction of English courts.63 American courts
generally (though not always6 ) have upheld these forum selection mechEuropean Communities Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1983 OJ. (C 97) 1, 18
I.L.M. 20 (Bruxelles Convention); Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, 28
I.L.M. 620 (Lugano Convention).
61 473 U.S. 614 (1985). The parties had selected Swiss law to govern a dispute
arising out of an automobile distribution agreement between a Japanese manufacturer
and an American automobile dealer. 1d. at 637 n.19. The dispute also raised an
American antitrust counterclaim under the Sherman Act. Id,at 619-20.
62 473 U.S. at 637 n.19. In the case at bar, the Court assumed (perhaps naively)
that the arbitrator would engage in choice-of-law ddpegage to apply the Sherman Act
to the antitrust counterclaims notwithstanding the Swiss choice of law.
6 For a discussion of these forum selection clauses and the relationships
implicated by membership in a Lloyd's syndicate, see Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting
Agencies Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 955 nn.2 & 3 (10th Cir. 1992).
64 The Southern District of Texas refused to enforce the forum selection clause at
issue in Leslie v. Lloyd's of London, No. H-90-1970, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15380, at
*98 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 1995).
60

1997]

TEXT AND CONTEXT

anisms despite investors' arguments that they undermine the strong public policy embodied in American securities laws.6"
The Supreme Court in Mitsubishi also warned that after an award is
rendered American judges might be called to determine whether arbitrators in fact addressed American public law claims. It is uncertain whether
this "second look doctrine" calls for a broad examination of an arbitrator's decision, or only a mechanical examination of whether the arbitrator
in fact did consider the statute. Either option presents risks. A full judicial examination of an award on its merits would impair the arbitral
autonomy sought by the parties initially. However, a look at an award to
determine only whether the arbitrator in fact considered public law questions would be unlikely to prevent clever arbitrators from ignoring
mandatory norms after having paid them lip service en passant.
V.

A.

PROMOTING RELIABILITY THROUGH CAREFUL DRAFTING

Guidelines

The cardinal rule of drafting an international arbitration agreement is
to avoid the type of ambiguity and equivocation that will later delight a
party wishing to drag its feet. In some cases a defective arbitration clause
may be simply unenforceable,66 or may deprive a party of the right to
remove to federal court an action to enforce the arbitration commitment.6 7 In other cases courts occasionally will repair a defective clause by
presuming the parties' intent as to missing elements.' Either way, the
ambiguity can add an unnecessary layer of contention to business relationships. One case involved a contract that provided for both arbitration
and submission to the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the courts of England.
The court made sense of the two clauses by interpreting the references to
English courts as a specification of the curial law governing the arbitration, covering matters such as interim measures of protection, vacancies
in the arbitral tribunal and the removal of arbitrators for misconduct.6"
65 See, e.g., Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993); Roby v.
Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993); Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting
Agencies Ltd., 969 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1992).
66 See National Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 817 F.2d 326, 334 (5th Cir.
1987), in which the court deemed itself without power to "repair" an arbitration
clause providing for arbitration in Iran.
67 See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Keeling, 996 F.2d 1485, 1489 (2d Cir. 1993).
68 See Rosgoscirc v. Circus Show Corp., Nos. 92 Civ. 8498 (JSM), 93 Civ. 1304
(JSM), 1993 WL 277333, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1993); cf. Bauhinia Corp. v. China
Nat'l Mach. & Equip. Import & Export Corp., 819 F.2d 247, 250 (9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that since the arbitration clause was ambiguous, the arbitration would take
place within the court's own district, even though several provisions made reference
to a Chinese forum).
69 Paul Smith Ltd. v. H & S Int'l Holding Inc., [1991] 2 Lloyd's Law Rep. 127, 130
(1991).
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In addition to an unambiguous submission to arbitration of all disputes
arising out of or connected with the contract,7" five other elements of an
arbitration clause are vital: (i) procedural rules with a workable mecha-

nism for appointing the arbitrators; (ii) the standard for fixing the arbitra-

tors' fees; (iii) the place of arbitration; (iv) the language of the
arbitration; and (v) the number of arbitrators. Additional elements that

are often desirable include provisions concerning choice-of-law (both
substantive and procedural71 ), pre-award attachment, interim judicial

injunctive relief and consolidation of related arbitral proceedings. Occasionally useful items include qualifications for arbitrators, time limits for
constitution of the tribunal and rendering of the award, authority for the

arbitrator to grant punitive damages (or prohibition thereof), allocation
of costs and attorneys' fees, a "last best offer" procedure and provision
for reasoned awards.
B.

Choosing an Arbitral Situs

Choice of an arbitral situs is perhaps the most important component of
an international arbitration agreement other than the institution and/or
rules for selecting the arbitrators. The New York Convention, by permitting refusal of recognition to awards set aside where rendered,7' entrusts
the place of arbitration with power either to uproot an award or vest it
with presumptive international currency.
Judicial review of awards at the place where rendered traditionally has
fallen into two categories: the first admits the possibility of judicial
review on the legal merits; the second limits judges to review of procedural irregularities such as arbitrator fraud and excess of authority. Judi-

cial review of the merits of the dispute tends to maximize legal certainty,
Not all clauses will be broad enough to cover claims related to fraud in the
inducement of the contract. See S.A. Mineracao da Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l,
Inc., 745 F.2d 190, 194 (2d Cir. 1984); cf JJ Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Rhone Poulenc
Textile S.A., 863 F.2d 315, 319-20 (4th Cir. 1988); Mediterranean Enters., Inc. v.
Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983).
71 See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland StanfordJunior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468 (1989), where California state law was held to apply both the merits of
the dispute and the arbitration procedure, with the consequence that an arbitration
was stayed under California law, pending resolution of related litigation. When the
law selected to interpret the principal contract is applied to the arbitration clause as
well, a court asked to recognize an arbitration clause in one jurisdiction (e.g., in New
York) may sometimes stay arbitration until the validity of the clause is determined by
a tribunal in the country whose law was selected (e.g., Venezuela). See the decision
by Judge Rakoff in Pepsico Inc. v. Oficina Central de Asesoriay Ayuda Technica, C.A.,
S.D.N.Y., 96 Civ. No. 7817, 28 October 1996.
72 New York Convention, supra note 4, art. 5(1)(e), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S.
at 42.
70
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while limiting review to matters of procedural fairness promotes
finality.73
The best place for arbitration is normally a country where the judiciary
will safeguard procedural integrity but not intervene to correct an arbitrator's honest mistake of law or fact. In arbitration, the parties assume
some risk of a bad award. The goal of finality does not, however, sanction arbitrator excess of authority, bias, or departure from a rule of fundamental procedural fairness.
CONCLUSION

The persons who decide a controversy often matters more than the
legal standards that purport to be relevant. Legal rules by themselves
have little power to stop a biased or corrupt judge from rendering an
unjust decision. Therefore, choice of forum may determine the outcome
of a dispute as much as the applicable substantive law.
Arbitration agreements and court selection clauses represent different
tools by which to reduce the risk of ending up before a biased foreign
judge in a conflict where the parties' different cultures create a high
degree of mutual suspicion. These two alternatives, however, may work
themselves out quite differently in practice.
In the United States, foreign judgments will benefit from not a single
enforcement treaty, and jurisdiction clauses receive dispositive effect
from no federal statute. Moreover, court selection agreements often will
prove ineffective when judges are unable or unwilling to allow the parties
to thrust a case upon the court, due either to limits on federal "subject
matter jurisdiction" or to forum non conveniens notions.
On the other hand, the New York Convention, now in force in over one
hundred countries, backed up by a network of national arbitration statutes, mandates enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards
throughout the world. In addition, concerns related to forum non conveniens and subject matter jurisdiction are unlikely to prevent a case
from being heard by arbitrators, assuming their fees can be paid.
Arbitration, of course, suffers from its own sources of uncertainty. In
most jurisdictions there exists no easy way to consolidate related arbitrations. Inconsistent United States Supreme Court decisions have left the
interaction of federal and state arbitration law obscure at best. Finally,
judicial pronouncements suggesting that arbitrators may be empowered
to determine their own jurisdiction, free from de novo judicial review,
risk misapplication by judges looking to use arbitration as a garbage pail
for difficult cases now clogging their dockets.
73

A third, but much less popular, paradigm for international arbitration has also

emerged, under which the arbitral situs does not provide any grounds at all on which
an award may be set aside. See Belgium's CODE JUDICIARE art. 1717; cf. Article 192
of Switzerland's conflict-of-laws code, LDIP, permitting but not mandating a similar
exclusion of all judicial review in some cases.
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Given this less-than-clear state of affairs in so many aspects of international litigation, very little good can come from dispute resolution clauses
based on habit rather than informed and critical analysis. To be useful
and happy advising on international business transactions, members of
the legal profession will need to learn to relish a considerable measure of
complexity when evaluating alternative forum selection mechanisms. A
standard form arbitration agreement or jurisdiction clause that was good
enough for yesterday's deal may not be right for the particular facts of
tomorrow's contract. Lawyers who draft "one size fits all" dispute resolution provisions invite disaster for the client, and perhaps a malpractice
action for themselves.

